GFI/SORBS – should I use them?

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Management Summary, Redistributable Documents and Links
In the past week we’ve demonstrated that the SORBS reputation data is riddled with mistakes, poor practices, security holes and operational problems, and that the quality of the end result is really too poor to be useful.
Today I’m looking at how this information should affect your choice of spam filtering technology.

Should my spam filters use GFI/SORBS data?

Simply, NO. The quality of reputation data GFI provide is too false-positive prone to rely on in production, even as part of a scoring system.

After all, a false positive is far worse than a false negative, as far as RBL (or general filtering system) usability is concerned.@delivery_kitty

And the problem isn’t just false positives.

Because it takes a long time before a spamming IP address reliably appears on the blacklist, not much spam is stopped. SORBS appears completely unsuitable to the most common way of spamming, via botnets.abuse department at xs4all, a major EU ISP

Your ISP
If you receive mail via your ISP then you’re unlikely to have problems with SORBS blocking your mail, as very few successful ISPs will use it for blocking outright. If you’re at a smaller ISP then they may well be using spam filters such as SpamAssassin, with a dependency on GFI / SORBS data sources, though.
But it’s not worth contacting your ISP unless you find out mail is being bounced or put into a junk folder due to a SORBS listing, or if you can tell by looking at the headers of email you receive that it’s being scored against SORBS.
(If you’re concerned about use of third-party reputation sources by your ISP, you could ask them to provide – or, better, publish – a list of the data sources they use, so their customers can make well-informed decisions about their filtering.)
Your Mailserver
If you run your own inbound mailserver, make sure it is not configured to use any of the SORBS blacklists for blocking email. How to do that varies depending on the server, but for commonly used linux mailservers grepping the configuration files for the string “sorbs” is probably a good place to check.
(There are some great blacklists, with very low false positive rates, to consider using instead – for IP based reputation: spamhaus zen, spamcop, cbl – and for URL reputation: spamhaus dbl, uribl, surbl)
SpamAssassin
SpamAssassin is a widely used server-side score based spam filter. Unfortunately it seems to ship with SORBS blacklists turned on “out of the box”.
I believe that adding the following to /etc/spamassassin/local.cf will disable it – I could be wrong, and would appreciate feedback from any SpamAssassin experts out there.

score RCVD_IN_SORBS_BLOCK 0
score RCVD_IN_SORBS_DUL 0
score RCVD_IN_SORBS_HTTP 0
score RCVD_IN_SORBS_MISC 0
score RCVD_IN_SORBS_SMTP 0
score RCVD_IN_SORBS_SOCKS 0
score RCVD_IN_SORBS_WEB 0
score RCVD_IN_SORBS_ZOMBIE 0

The default SpamAssassin scores are pretty low, so it doesn’t pay that much attention to SORBS – but that a spam filter as influential as SpamAssassin uses such a poor source of data at all is a bit of a problem. Hopefully the SpamAssassin developers will look at the issue for a future release.
Commercial Products
If you’re using a commercial spam filter, check where they’re getting their reputation data from. If you have an existing commercial filter that can use external blacklists, make sure it’s use of SORBS is disabled.
If you’re considering purchasing a new commercial spam filter, there are two things you need to consider. First, if the filter supports using SORBS or other GFI-derived reputation data make sure that can be disabled. Second, if you’re considering a commercial product that uses SORBS or GFI data out of the box, despite the multi-year history of false positives and other problems, think about how solid their other product engineering decisions might be.

I for one will not be considering any products from GFI. I had budgeted and received approval for $20K worth of GFI NSM next year. I will not be making that purchase after this latest episode with SORBS.Skyhawk

Outsourced Services
Outsourced spam filtering services can be very opaque about what approaches they use to decide whether or not email is spam, and will often hide their use of external reputation services.
Some of them are more open than others. Proofpoint posted SORBS DUHL DNS Block List Causing Widespread Email Deliverability Issues Once Again (note that GFI told Proofpoint the problem was fixed on Nov 30th, which we know isn’t true), but it’s rare that a SaaS provider will be that open about how a problem is caused by their reliance on a third-party service. Kudos to Proofpoint for their openness (though they should look elsewhere for reputation data).
Edit: Proofpoint have clarified that they were discussing the problems some of their customers had sending email due to false SORBS listingsnot that they were using any data from GFI themselves. Sorry, guys. So if you’re looking for a filtering appliance or outsourced service that’s GFI/SORBS-free (and also quite a nice product), Proofpoint is worth a look.
If your SaaS or outsourced spam filter provider has a clear statement in their product description or contract which third-party data sources they use, then you have the information you need. If not, you should probably contact your support representative and find out whether they use SORBS or not. If they decline to make any statement on it, assume the worst.

In the case of SORBS, this is (at least) the second major misclassification issue we’ve observed in the last 90 days. Email administrators who currently rely on SORBS should be aware of these issues and take action as necessary.Proofpoint

There’s nothing wrong with an outsourced provider using reputable third-party services but if they’re relying on poor quality data sources you may find mail to you being bounced for no good reason, at any time. If that’s the situation you’d be well advised to consider looking at alternative filtering providers.

And Finally

There’s a lot more that could be said, but I’m sure you’re interested in seeing some non-GFI/SORBS content on this blog (and there’s a limit to the amount of technical and business analysis I really want to do for someone other than a paying customer).
Laura will probably revisit the subject soon, going into some more detail about the policy problems that I just touched lightly on and looking more generally about what other companies can learn. And I know several other industry bloggers are planning on discussing GFI and SORBS in the next week or two.
I’ll be gathering links and some other information, including a PDF version of this series of articles suitable for mailing out, at https://wordtothewise.com/sorbs/ over the next day or two.

Related Posts

GFI/SORBS considered harmful, part 3

Act 1Act 2IntermezzoAct 3Act 4Act 5
Management Summary, Redistributable Documents and Links
In the last few days we’ve talked about GFI’s lack of responsiveness, the poor quality of their reputation and blacklist data, and the interesting details of their DDoS claims. Today we’re going to look at (some of) the fundamental problems with GFI’s procedures and infrastructure that cause those issues. Some of the subset of issues I’ve chosen highlight are minor, some are major, but they show a pattern of poor decisions.
SSL Certificates
When you use SSL on a web connection it brings you two benefits. The first is that it encrypts the connection between your browser and the webserver, so that it’s very difficult for anyone to watch or tamper with your interaction with that webserver. The second, more important, reason is to make sure that you’re talking to the webserver you think you’re talking to, to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.
This security relies on you trusting the certification authority that issues the SSL certificate that the website uses. A website providing services to the public should always use an SSL certificate created by one of a small number of reputable certification authorities that are pre-loaded into all webservers as “trusted”. These SSL certificates are something that need to be be purchased, but they’re very inexpensive – less than ten dollars a year.

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We're gonna party like it's 1996!

Over on deliverability.com Dela Quist has a long blog post up talking about how changes to Hotmail and Gmail’s priority inbox are a class action suit waiting to happen.
All I can say is that it’s all been tried before. Cyberpromotions v. AOL started the ball rolling when they tried to use the First Amendment to force AOL to accept their unsolicited email. The courts said No.
Time goes on and things change. No one argues Sanford wasn’t spamming, he even admitted as much in his court documents. He was attempting to force AOL to accept his unsolicited commercial email for their users. Dela’s arguments center around solicited mail, though.
Do I really think that minor difference in terminology going to change things?
No.
First off “solicited” has a very squishy meaning when looking at any company, particularly large national brands. “We bought a list” and “This person made a purchase from us” are more common than any email marketer wants to admit to. Buying, selling and assuming permission are par for the course in the “legitimate” email marketing world. Just because the marketer tells me that I solicited their email does not actually mean I solicited their email.
Secondly, email marketers don’t get to dictate what recipients do and do not want. Do ISPs occasionally make boneheaded filtering decisions? I’d be a fool to say no. But more often than not when an ISP blocks your mail or filters it into the bulk folder they are doing it because the recipients don’t want that mail and don’t care that it’s in the bulk folder. Sorry, much of the incredibly important marketing mail isn’t actually that important to the recipient.
Dela mentions things like bank statements and bills. Does he really think that recipients are too stupid to add the from address to their address books? Or create specific filters so they can get the mail they want? People do this regularly and if they really want mail they have the tools, provided by the ISP, to make the mail they want get to where they want it.
Finally, there is this little law that protects ISPs. 47 USC 230 states:

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Content based filtering

A spam filter looks at many things when it’s deciding whether or not to deliver a message to the recipients inbox, usually divided into two broad categories – the behaviour of the sender and the content of the message.
When we talk about sender behaviour we’ll often dive headfirst into the technical details of how that’s monitored and tracked – history of mail from the same IP address, SPF records, good reverse DNS, send rates and ramping, polite SMTP level behaviour, DKIM and domain-based reputation and so on. If all of those are OK and the mail still doesn’t get delivered then you might throw up your hands, fall back on “it’s content-based filtering” and not leave it at that.
There’s just as much detail and scope for diagnosis in content-based filtering, though, it’s just a bit more complex, so some delivery folks tend to gloss over it. If you’re sending mail that people want to receive, you’re sure you’re sending the mail technically correctly and you have a decent reputation as a sender then it’s time to look at the content.
You want your mail to look just like wanted mail from reputable, competent senders and to look different to unwanted mail, viruses, phishing emails, botnet spoor and so on. And not just to mechanical spam filters – if a postmaster looks at your email, you want it to look clean, honest and competently put together to them too.
Some of the distinctive content differences between wanted and unwanted email are due to the content as written by the sender, some of them are due to senders of unwanted email trying to hide their identity or their content, but many of them are due to the different quality software used to send each sort of mail. Mail clients used by individuals, and content composition software used by high quality ESPs tends to be well written and complies with both the email and MIME RFCs, and the unwritten best common practices for email composition. The software used by spammers, botnets, viruses and low quality ESPs tends not to do so well.
Here’s a (partial) list of some of the things to consider:

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