Blocklist BCP

As many of you may be aware there is a draft document working its way through the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) discussing best common practices for blocklists. The IRTF is a parallel organization to the IETF and is charged with long term research related to the Internet. The Anti-Spam Working Group was chartered to investigate tools and techniques for dealing with spam.
Recently the ASRG posted a draft of a best practices document aimed at those running blocklists (draft-irtf-asrg-bcp-blacklists-07). This document has been under development for many years. The authors have used this document to share their experiences with running blocklists and their knowledge of what works and what doesn’t.
Best practices documents are never easy to write and consensus can be difficult. But I think that the authors did a good job capturing what the best practices are for blocklists. I do support the document in principle and, in fact, support many of the specific statements and practices outlined there. As with any best practices documents it’s not perfect but overall it reflects the current best practices for blocklists.
Ken Magill’s article about the BCP
Anti-Abuse buzz article about the BCP

Related Posts

GFI/SORBS considered harmful, part 2

Act 1 • Act 2 • Intermezzo • Act 3 • Act 4 • Act 5
Management Summary, Redistributable Documents and Links
Yesterday I talked about GFI responsiveness to queries and delisting requests about SORBS listings. Today I’m going to look at data accuracy.
The two issues are tightly intertwined – a blacklist that isn’t responsive to reports of false positive listings will end up with a lot of stale or inaccurate data, and a blacklist that has many false positives will likely be overwhelmed with complaints and delisting requests, and won’t be able to respond to them – leading to a spiral of dissatisfaction and inaccurate data feeding off each other.

Read More

GFI/SORBS considered harmful, part 3

Act 1 • Act 2 • Intermezzo • Act 3 • Act 4 • Act 5
Management Summary, Redistributable Documents and Links
In the last few days we’ve talked about GFI’s lack of responsiveness, the poor quality of their reputation and blacklist data, and the interesting details of their DDoS claims. Today we’re going to look at (some of) the fundamental problems with GFI’s procedures and infrastructure that cause those issues. Some of the subset of issues I’ve chosen highlight are minor, some are major, but they show a pattern of poor decisions.
SSL Certificates
When you use SSL on a web connection it brings you two benefits. The first is that it encrypts the connection between your browser and the webserver, so that it’s very difficult for anyone to watch or tamper with your interaction with that webserver. The second, more important, reason is to make sure that you’re talking to the webserver you think you’re talking to, to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.
This security relies on you trusting the certification authority that issues the SSL certificate that the website uses. A website providing services to the public should always use an SSL certificate created by one of a small number of reputable certification authorities that are pre-loaded into all webservers as “trusted”. These SSL certificates are something that need to be be purchased, but they’re very inexpensive – less than ten dollars a year.

Read More

GFI/SORBS – I'm blacklisted, now what?

Act 1 • Act 2 • Intermezzo • Act 3 • Act 4 • Act 5
Management Summary, Redistributable Documents and Links
In the past week we’ve demonstrated that the SORBS reputation data is riddled with mistakes, poor practices, security holes and operational problems, and that the quality of the end result is really too poor to be useful.
What does this mean to you though? There are really two aspects: 1. what to do if you’re blacklisted or blocked by GFI or based on GFI/SORBS data and 2. how this information should affect your choice of spam filtering technology. We’ll be looking at the first point today, and the second tomorrow.

Read More