Policing customers

In yesterday’s post about Cloudflare and Spamhaus Fazal comments that Cloudflare may have been asked by law enforcement to leave the website up.
This does happen and it’s not totally out of the question that’s what is going on with this particular website. But I used the malware C&C as an example of the poor behaviour condoned by Cloudflare, it’s certainly not the only bad behaviour. There’s also the issue that Cloudflare disavows all responsibility for the behaviour of their customers.

CloudFlare is a pass-through network provider that automatically caches content for a limited period in order to improve network performance. CloudFlare is not a hosting provider and does not provide hosting services for any website.
We do not have the capability to remove content from the web. If your submission is found to be legitimate, you will be directed to the appropriate provider for your report. Only reports of URLs resolving to CloudFlare IPs will be reviewed and appropriately handled. Cloudflare Abuse Policy

This doesn’t sound like the abuse policy of a network that actually is interested in policing their customers.

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Dealing with complaints

There are a lot of people who abuse online services and use online services to abuse and harass other people. But handling complaints and handling the abuse are often afterthoughts for many new companies. They don’t think about how to accept and process complaints until they show up. Nor do they think about how bad people can abuse a system before hand.
But dealing with complaints is important and can be complicated. I’ve written many a complaint handling process document over the years, but even I was impressed with the Facebook flowchart that’s been passed around recently.

In the email space, though, all too many companies just shrug off complaints. They don’t really pay attention to what recipients are saying and treat complaints merely as unsubscribe requests. Their whole goal is to keep complaints below the threshold that gets them blocked at ISPs. To be fair, this isn’t as true with ESPs as it is with direct senders, many ESPs pay a lot of attention to complaints and will, in fact, initiate an investigation into a customer’s practice on a report from a trusted complainant.
There are a lot of legitimate email senders out there who value quantity over quality when it comes to complaints. But that doesn’t mean their lists are good or clean or they won’t see delivery problems or SBL listings at some point.

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Where do you accept reports?

One of the things that is most frustrating to me about sending in spam reports is that many ESPs and senders don’t actively monitor their abuse address. A few months ago I talked about getting spam from Dell to multiple email addresses of mine.
What I didn’t talk about was how badly broken the ESP was in handling my complaint. The ESP was, like many ESPs, an organization that grew organically and also purchased several smaller ESPs over the course of a few years. This means they have at least 5 or 6 different domains.
The problem is, they don’t effectively monitor abuse@ for those different domains. In fact, it took me blogging about it to get any response from the ESP. Unfortunately, that initial response was “why didn’t you tell us about it?”
I pointed out I’d tried abuse@domain1, abuse@domain2, abuse@domain3, and abuse@domain4. Some of the addresses were in the mail headers, others were in the ESP record at abuse.net. Three of those addresses bounced with “no such user.” In other words, I’d tried to tell them, but they weren’t accepting reports in a way I could access.
Every ESP should have active abuse addresses at domains that show up in their mail. This means the bounce address domain should have an abuse address. The reverse DNS domain should have an abuse address. The d= domain should have an abuse address.
And those addresses should be monitored. In the Dell case, the ESP did have an active abuse@ address but it was handled by corporate. Corporate dropped the ball and never forwarded the complaint to the ESP reps who could act on the spam issue.
ESPs and all senders should have abuse@ addresses that are monitored. They should also be tested on a regular basis. In the above case, addresses that used to work were disabled during some upgrade or another. No one thought to test to see if they were working after the change.
You should also test your process. If you send in a complaint, how does it get handled? What happens? Do you even have a complaint handling process outside of “count and forward”?
All large scale senders should have appropriate abuse@ addresses that are monitored. If you don’t, well, you look like a spammer.

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Cloudflare and Spamhaus

Spamhaus has been the subject of a lot of discussion the last few weeks. I touched on this a little in June when I blogged that a number of large brands were getting SBL listings.
But big brands are not the only companies with publicly discussed SBL listings.
Cloudflare, the content delivery network that grew out of project honeypot, has a number of SBL listings, covering at least 2 /18s and a /20. Representatives and customers of Cloudflare have been discussing the listings on twitter.
As a content provider, Cloudflare isn’t actually sending mail nor are they actually hosting the content. What they are doing is providing consistent name service and traffic routing to malicious websites. In fact, they’ve been providing services to a malware botnet controller (SBL138291) since May, 2012. They’re also providing services to a number of SEO spammers. Both of these actions are justification for a SBL listing, and Spamhaus has a history of listing providers protecting spammers.
Cloudflare claims they take action on all “properly filed complaints” and they may actually do that. But their reports require quite a bit of information and require consent for releasing information to 3rd parties. Looking at the website, it appears to me to be a site designed to discourage abuse reports and stop people from reporting problems to Cloudflare.
When you look at the Cloudflare business model it’s clearly one that will be abused. Cloudflare acts as a reverse proxy / pass through network that caches data from their customers. This protects the abusers webhosting setup and prevents people tracking the abuser from being able to determine the true host of a website. As a responsible internet citizen, Cloudflare should be disconnecting the customers hiding behind Cloudflare’s services.
Unfortunately, Cloudflare seems unwilling to actually police their customers. They’ve taken a totally hands off approach.
Let’s be frank. Cloudflare has been providing service to Botnet C&C servers for at least two months. It doesn’t matter that the abuser has the malware on a machine elsewhere, Cloudflare’s IP is the one that serves the data. I don’t care what you think about spam, providing service to malware providers is totally unacceptable. It’s even more unacceptable when you claim to be a security company. Nothing about malware is legitimate and the fact that Cloudflare is continuing to host a malware network command and control node is concerning at the very least.
Cloudflare (.pdf) is listed on Spamhaus for providing spam support services. The most obvious of these is providing service to a malware controller. And Spamhaus escalated the listings because they are allowing other abusers to hide behind their reverse proxy.

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