Is gmail next?

I’m hearing hints that there are some malware or phishing links being sent out to gmail address books, “from” those gmail addresses. If that is what’s happening then it’s much the same thing as has been happening at Yahoo for a while, and AOL more recently, and that triggered their deployment of DMARC p=reject records.
It’s going to be interesting to see what happens over the next few days.
I’ve not seen any analysis of how the compromises happened at Yahoo and AOL – do they share a server-side (XSS?) security flaw, or is this a client-side compromise that affects many end users, and is just being targeted at freemail providers one at a time?
Does anyone have any technical details that go any deeper than #AOLHacked and #gmailhacked?

Why do we "warmup" IP addresses
AOL admits to security breach

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If you have questions or want to ask specifically about what to do in your setup, I’ve blocked out some time in my schedule next week for companies. If you want more information about this please contact me to for available times, information requirements and pricing.

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