SWAKS is a general purpose testing tool for SMTP. For basic SMTP testing it’s a more convenient, scriptable alternative to running a transaction by hand, but it also lets you test things that are difficult to do manually, such as authentication or TLS encryption. It’s a perl script that installs fairly easily on OS X or any Linux/unix system (and can be installed on Windows, if you...
I can't click through if you don't exist
Recipients can’t click through if you don’t exist A tale of misconfigured DNS wrecking someone’s campaign. I got mail this morning from A Large Computer Supplier, asking me to fill in a survey about them. I had some feedback for them, mostly along the lines of “It’s been two decades since I bought anything other than rackmount servers from you, maybe I’m not a...
DMARC and report size limits
I just saw an interesting observation on the dmarc-discuss mailing list. Apparently some of the larger providers who are implementing DMARC for inbound email may not be handling some of the grubbier corners of the spec perfectly. That’s not surprising at all – early adopters tend to deploy code that implements early versions of the draft specification – but I can see this...
Alice and Bob and PGP Keys
Last week Alice and Bob showed how to cryptographically sign messages so that the recipient can be sure that the message came from the purported sender and hasn’t been forged by a third party. They can only do that if they can securely retrieve the senders public key – which means they need to retrieve it from the actual sender, rather than an impostor, and be sure it’s not...
Alice and Bob Sign Messages
Alice and Bob can send messages privately via a nosy postman, but how does Bob know that a message he receives is really from Alice, rather than from the postman pretending to be Alice? If they’re using symmetric-key encryption, and Bob is sure that he was talking to Alice when they exchanged keys, then he already knows that the mail is from Alice – as only he and Alice have the keys...
Who's publishing DMARC?
DMARC is a way for a domain owner to say “If you see this domain in a From: header and it’s not been sent straight from us, please don’t deliver the mail”. If a domain is only used for bulk and transactional mail, it can mitigate a subset of phishing attacks without causing too many problems for legitimate email. In other cases, it can cause significant problems. Some of...
Cryptography with Alice and Bob
Untrusted Communication Channels This is a story about Alice and Bob. Alice wants to send a private message to Bob, and the only easy way they have to communicate is via postal mail. Unfortunately, Alice is pretty sure that the postman is reading the mail she sends. That makes Alice sad, so she decides to find a way to send messages to Bob without anyone else being able to read them. Symmetric...
Cryptography and Email
A decade or so ago it was fairly rare for cryptography and email technology to intersect – there was S/MIME (which I’ve seen described as having “more implementations than users”) and PGP, which was mostly known for adding inscrutable blocks of text to mail and for some interesting political fallout, but not much else. That’s changing, though. Authentication and...
Make Mail.app work for you
Mark Nottingham (@mnot) posted a good idea to twitter: Highlight e-mails that your MTA receives with TLS. Make sure to include your mail server’s name in the value (here to the left of what’s shown) Mail.app has client support for mail routing rules. Out of the box all they’re configured to do is highlight mail from Apple, but Mark is adding a rule to passively...
The origins of network email
The history of long distance communication is a fascinating, and huge, subject. I’m going to focus just on the history of network email – otherwise I’m going to get distracted by AUTODIN and semaphore and facsimile and all sorts of other telegraphy. Electronic messaging between users on the same timesharing computer was developed fairly soon after time-sharing computer systems...